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Abstract
To keep the hardware costs of future communications systems manageable, the use of low-cost
hardware components is desirable. This is particularly true for the emerging massive multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) systems which equip base stations (BSs) with a large number of antenna
elements. However, low-cost transceiver designs will further accentuate the hardware impairments which
are present in any practical communication system. In this paper, we investigate the impact of hardware
impairments on the secrecy performance of downlink massive MIMO systems in the presence of a
passive multiple-antenna eavesdropper. Thereby, for the BS and the legitimate users, the joint effects
of multiplicative phase noise, additive distortion noise, and amplified receiver noise are taken into
account, whereas the eavesdropper is assumed to employ ideal hardware. We derive a lower bound for
the ergodic secrecy rate of a given user when matched filter (MF) data precoding and artificial noise
(AN) transmission are employed at the BS. Based on the derived analytical expression, we investigate
the impact of the various system parameters on the secrecy rate and optimize both the pilot sets used
for uplink training and the AN precoding. Our analytical and simulation results reveal that 1) the
additive distortion noise at the BS may be beneficial for the secrecy performance, especially if the
power assigned for AN emission is not sufficient; 2) all other hardware impairments have a negative
impact on the secrecy performance; 3) despite their susceptibility to pilot interference in the presence
of phase noise, so-called spatially orthogonal pilot sequences are preferable unless the phase noise is
very strong; 4) the proposed generalized null-space (NS) AN precoding method can efficiently mitigate
the negative effects of phase noise.
This work has been in part presented at The 17th IEEE International Workshop on Signal Processing Advances in Wireless
Communications 2016 (SPAWC 2016) [1].
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2I. INTRODUCTION
The emerging massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) architecture promises tremen-
dous performance gains in terms of network throughput and energy efficiency by employing
simple coherent processing across arrays of hundreds or even thousands of base station (BS)
antennas, serving tens or hundreds of mobile terminals [2], [3]. Thereby, physical layer channel
impairments such as fading, additive Gaussian noise, and interference are averaged out in the limit
of an infinite number of antennas [2]- [5]. As an additional benefit, massive MIMO is inherently
more secure than conventional MIMO systems, as the large-scale antenna array equipped at
the transmitter (Alice) can accurately focus a narrow and directional information beam on the
intended terminal (Bob), such that the received signal power at Bob is several orders of magnitude
higher than that at any incoherent passive eavesdropper (Eve) [6]. Unfortunately, this benefit
may vanish if Eve also employs a massive antenna array for eavesdropping. In this case, unless
additional measures to secure the communication are taken by Alice, even a single passive Eve
may be able to intercept the signal intended for Bob [7], [8].
Since security is a critical concern for future communication systems, facilitating secrecy
at the physical layer of (massive) MIMO systems has received significant attention recently.
Physical layer security for conventional (non-massive) MIMO transmission has been extensively
studied in the literature, e.g. [9]–[11]. A large system secrecy analysis of MIMO systems was
provided in [12], [13]. Thereby, availability of Eve’s channel state information (CSI) at Alice
was assumed, which is an optimistic assumption in practice. Artificial noise (AN) generation
[14] was employed to provide physical layer security in a multi-cell massive MIMO system with
pilot contamination in [7] for the case when Eve’s CSI is not known. Thereby, it was shown
that secure communication can be achieved even with simple matched filter (MF) precoding
of the data and null-space (NS) precoding of the AN. Nevertheless, it was revealed in [15]
that significant additional performance gains are possible with more sophisticated data and AN
precoders, including polynomial precoders. Furthermore, AN-aided jamming of Rician fading
massive MIMO channels was investigated in [16]. In the context of massive MIMO relaying, the
work presented in [17] compared two classic relaying schemes, i.e., amplify-and forward (AF)
and decode-and-forward (DF), for physical layer security with imperfect CSI at the massive
MIMO relay. While [7]- [17] assumed that Eve is passive, the so-called pilot contamination
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3attack, a form of active eavesdropping, was also considered in the literature. In particular, several
techniques for detection of the pilot contamination attack were proposed in [6]. Moreover, the
authors in [18] developed a secret key agreement protocol under the pilot contamination attack,
and the authors in [19] proposed to encrypt the pilot sequence in order to hide it from the
attacker. Several techniques for combating the pilot contamination attack at the physical layer
of a multi-cell massive MIMO system were proposed in [20].
All aforementioned works on secure massive MIMO are based on the assumption that the
transceivers of the legitimate users are equipped with perfect hardware components, i.e., the
effects of hardware impairments (HWIs) were not taken into account. Nevertheless, all practical
implementations do suffer from HWIs such as phase noise, quantization errors, amplification
noise, and nonlinearities [21]. These impairments are expected to be particularly pronounced
in massive MIMO systems as the excessive number of BS antennas makes the use of low-
cost components desirable to keep the overall capital expenditures for operators manageable.
Although HWIs can be mitigated by analog and digital signal processing techniques [22], they
cannot be removed completely, due to the randomness introduced by the different sources of
imperfection. The remaining residual HWIs can be modelled by a combination of phase noise and
additive distortion noises at the transmitter and the receiver [22]. Several works have investigated
the impact of HWIs on massive MIMO systems [21], [23]- [26]. The impact of phase noise
originating from free-running oscillators on the downlink performance of massive MIMO systems
was studied in [23] for different linear precoder designs. Constant envelope precoding for massive
MIMO was studied in [24] and [25] with the objective of avoiding distortions caused by power
amplifier nonlinearities at the transmitter. The impact of the aggregate effects of several HWIs
originating from different sources on massive MIMO systems was studied in [21] by modelling
the residual impairments remaining after compensation as additive distortion noises [22]. The
authors in [26] presented closed-form expressions for the achievable user rates in uplink massive
MIMO systems for a general residual HWI model including both multiplicative phase noise and
additive distortion noise. The aforementioned works demonstrated that HWIs can severely limit
the performance of massive MIMO systems. Thereby, a crucial role is played by the degradation
caused by phase noise to the quality of the CSI estimates needed for precoder design. On the
one hand, phase noise causes the CSI estimates to become outdated more quickly. On the other
hand, it may cause a loss of orthogonality of the pilot sequences employed by the different users
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4in a cell for uplink training. To overcome the latter effect, so-called temporally orthogonal (TO)
and spatially orthogonal (SO) pilot sequences were investigated in [26]. Furthermore, the impact
of the number of local oscillators (LOs) employed at the massive MIMO BS on performance in
the presence of phase noise was studied in [23], [26], while the effect of HWIs on full-duplex
massive MIMO relaying was considered in [27].
Communication secrecy aspects are not adequately considered in existing works studying the
impact of HWIs in the context of massive MIMO system design [21], [23]- [27]. However, if
communication secrecy is considered, an additional challenge arises: Whereas the legitimate user
of the system will likely employ low-cost equipment giving rise to HWIs, the eavesdropper is
expected to employ high-quality HWI-free equipment. This disparity in equipment quality was
not considered in the related work on physical layer security [7]- [20] nor in the related work on
HWIs [21], [23]- [26] and necessitates the development of a new analysis and design framework.
For example, NS AN precoding, which was widely used to enhance the achievable secrecy rate
of massive MIMO systems [7], [15], [29], becomes ineffective in the presence of phase noise.
Motivated by the above considerations, in this paper, we present the first study of physical layer
security in hardware constrained massive MIMO systems. Thereby, we focus on the downlink
and adopt for the legitimate links the generic residual HWI model from [22], [26], which includes
the effects of multiplicative phase noise and additive distortion noise at the BS and the users.
As a worst-case scenario, the eavesdropper is assumed to employ ideal hardware. Our main
contributions are summarized as follows.
• For the adopted generic residual HWI model, we derive a tight lower bound for the ergodic
secrecy rate achieved by a downlink user when MF data precoding is employed at the
massive MIMO BS. The derived bound provides insight into the impact of various system
and channel parameters, such as the phase noise variance, the additive distortion noise
parameters, the AN precoder design, the amount of power allocated to the AN, the pilot
sequence design, the number of deployed LOs, and the number of users, on the ergodic
secrecy rate.
• As conventional NS AN precoding is sensitive to phase noise, we propose a novel gen-
eralized NS (G-NS) AN precoding design, which mitigates the AN leakage caused to the
legitimate user in the presence of phase noise at the expense of a reduction of the available
spatial degrees of freedom. The proposed method leads to significant performance gains,
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5especially in systems with large numbers of antennas at the BS.
• We generalize the SO and TO pilot sequence designs from [26] to orthogonal pilot sequences
with arbitrary numbers of non-zero elements. Although SO sequences, which have no
zero elements, are preferable for small phase noise variances, sequence designs with zero
elements become beneficial in the presence of strong phase noise.
• Our analytical and numerical results reveal that while HWIs in general degrade the achiev-
able secrecy rate, the proposed countermeasures are effective in limiting this degradation.
Furthermore, surprisingly, there are cases when the additive distortion noise at the BS is
beneficial for the secrecy performance as it can have a similar effect as AN.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the models for uplink
training and downlink data transmission in the considered massive MIMO system with imperfect
hardware are presented. In Section III, we derive a lower bound on the achievable ergodic secrecy
rate and introduce the proposed G-NS AN precoder design. In Section IV, the impact of the
various system and channel parameters on the secrecy performance is investigated based on the
derived lower bound. In Section V, the achievable secrecy rate is studied via simulation and
numerical evaluation of the derived analytical expressions. Conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
Notation: Superscripts T and H stand for the transpose and conjugate transpose, respectively.
IN is the N-dimensional identity matrix. The expectation operation and the variance of a random
variable are denoted by E[·] and var[·], respectively. diag{x} denotes a diagonal matrix with the
elements of vector x on the main diagonal. tr{·} denotes the trace of a matrix. Cm×n represents
the space of all m × n matrices with complex-valued elements. x ∼ CN(0N ,Σ) denotes a
circularly symmetric complex Gaussian vector x ∈ CN×1 with zero mean and covariance matrix
Σ. [A]kl denotes the element in the kth row and lth column of matrix A. [x]+ = max{x, 0} and
⌊x⌋ stands for the largest integer no greater than x. Finally, |S| represents the cardinality of set
S.
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODELS
The considered massive MIMO system model comprises an N-antenna BS, K single-antenna
mobile terminals (MTs), and an NE-antenna eavesdropper. The eavesdropper is passive in order
to hide its existence from the BS and the MTs. Similar to [21], [26], we assume that after
proper compensation the residual HWIs manifest themselves at the BS and the MTs in the
August 11, 2016 DRAFT
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Fig. 1. Uplink training and downlink transmission phase.
form of 1) multiplicative phase noises at transmitter and receiver, 2) transmit and receive power
dependent distortion noises at transmitter and receiver, respectively, and 3) amplified thermal
noise at the receiver. The impact of this general HWI model on uplink training and downlink
data transmission is investigated in Sections II-A and II-B, respectively, and the signal model
for the eavesdropper is presented in Section II-C. In this paper, we consider a single-cell system.
This allows us to concentrate on the main focus of our work, i.e., studying the impact of HWIs
on physical layer security in massive MIMO systems. Naturally, the obtained results can serve
as a benchmark for multi-cell massive MIMO systems with HWIs.
A. Uplink Pilot Training under HWIs
In massive MIMO systems, the CSI is usually acquired via uplink training by exploiting
the channel reciprocity between uplink and downlink in time-division duplex (TDD) mode [3],
[5]. Here, we assume that the first B symbol intervals of the coherence time, which comprises
T symbol intervals, are used for uplink training. Thereby, we split the training phase into Bo
sub-phases of lengths Bb, 1 ≤ b ≤ Bo, where
∑Bo
b=1Bb = B, cf. Fig. 1. Furthermore, the K
MTs are assigned to Bo disjunct sets Sb, 1 ≤ b ≤ Bo, with |Sb| ≤ Bb and ∑Bob=1 |Sb| = K.
In training sub-phase b, the MTs in set Sb emit mutually orthogonal pilot sequences ωk =
[ωk(1), ωk(2), . . . , ωk(Bb)]
T ∈ CBb×1, k ∈ Sb, for which we assume a per-pilot power constraint
|ωk(t)|2 = pτ , ∀k, t, whereas all MTs k /∈ Sb are silent 1. For larger values of Bb, the total energy
of the pilot sequences is larger but, as will be shown later, the loss of orthogonality caused by
phase noise becomes also more pronounced. Hence, Bb or equivalently Bo (assuming a fixed
B) should be optimized for maximization of the secrecy rate. We note that the proposed pilot
1We adopt a per-pilot power constraint, as in practice, systems are peak power limited, e.g., [4], [5], [21]. We note that some
of our results and conclusions may change if an average power constraint for the pilot sequence was employed.
August 11, 2016 DRAFT
7design is a generalization of the SO and TO pilot designs proposed in [23], [26] which result
as special cases for Bo = 1 and Bo = B, respectively.
In symbol interval t ∈ Tb, where Tb denotes the set of symbol intervals in training sub-phase
b, 1 ≤ b ≤ Bo, the received uplink vector yUL(t) ∈ CN×1 at the BS is given by
yUL(t) =
∑
k∈Sb
Θk(t)gk(ωk(t) + η
MT
t,k (t)) + η
BS
r (t) + ξ
UL(t). (1)
Here, the channel vector of the kth MT, gk ∼ CN(0N , βkIN), is modelled as block Rayleigh
fading, where βk denotes the path-loss. Thereby, gk is assumed to be constant during coherence
time T and change independently afterwards. In (1), the terms Θk(t), ηMTt,k (t), ηBSr (t), and
ξUL(t) characterize the HWIs affecting the uplink training phase and are explained in detail in
the following:
1) Phase noise: Matrix
Θk(t) = diag
(
ejθ
1
k
(t)11×N/No , . . . , e
jθNo
k
(t)11×N/No
)
∈ CN×N (2)
models the phase noise originating from the free-running LOs equipped at the BS and the MTs
[23]. Thereby, we assume that at the BS each group of N/No ∈ Z antennas is connected to
one free-running LO. θlk(t) = ψl(t) + φk(t) is the phase noise that distorts the link between the
lth LO at the BS and the kth MT. Adopting the discrete-time Wiener phase noise model [23],
in time interval t, the phase noises at the lth LO of the BS and the kth MT are modelled as
ψl(t) ∼ CN(ψl(t− 1), σ2ψ), 1 ≤ l ≤ No, and φk(t) ∼ CN(φk(t− 1), σ2φ), 1 ≤ k ≤ K, where σ2ψ
and σ2φ are the phase noise (increment) variances at the BS and the MTs, respectively.
2) Distortion noise: ηMTt,k (t) ∈ C and ηBSr (t) ∈ CN×1 model the additive distortion noises at the
kth MT and the BS, respectively, which originate from residual effects after compensation of
HWIs such as power amplifier non-linearities at the transmitter, quantization noise in the analog-
to-digital converters (ADCs) at the receiver, etc. [21]. Distortion noise is modeled as a Gaussian
distributed random process in the literature [21], [22]. This model has been experimentally
verified in [28]. Furthermore, at each antenna, the distortion noise power is proportional to the
corresponding signal power, i.e., ηMTt,k (t) ∼ CN(0, υMTt,k ) and ηBSr (t) ∼ CN(0N ,ΥBSr ), where
υMTt,k = κ
MT
t E[|ωk(t)|2] and ΥBSr = κBSr
K∑
k=1
E[|ωk(t)|2]Rdiagk . (3)
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8Here, Rdiagk = diag
(|g1k|2, . . . , |gNk |2), where gik denotes the ith element of gk, and parameters
κMTt , κ
BS
r > 0 denote the ratio between the additive distortion noise variance and the signal
power and are measures for the severity of the residual HWIs.
3) Amplified thermal noise: ξUL(t) ∼ CN(0N , ξULIN) models the thermal noise amplified by
the low noise amplifier and other components such as mixers at the receiver [26]. Therefore, the
variance of this noise is generally larger than that of the actual thermal noise σ2n, i.e., ξUL > σ2n.
For channel estimation, we collect the signal vectors received during the bth training phase
in vector ψb = [(yUL(Bb−1 + 1))T , . . . , (yUL(Bb))T ]T ∈ CBbN×1, b = 1, . . . , Bo, where Bb ,∑b
i=1Bi and B0 = 0, and define the effective channel vector at time t as gk(t) = Θk(t)gk. With
these definitions, the linear minimum mean-square error (LMMSE) estimate of the channel of
MT k ∈ Sb at time t ∈ {B + 1, . . . , T} (i.e., during the data transmission phase) can be written
as [26]
gˆk(t) = E[gk(t)ψ
H
b ]
(
E[ψbψ
H
b ]
)−1
ψb =
(
βkω
H
k Θ
b
σ(t)Σ
−1
b ⊗ IN
)
ψb, (4)
where
Θbσ(t) = diag
(
e−
σ2
ψ
+σ2
φ
2
|t−Bb−1−1|, . . . , e−
σ2
ψ
+σ2
φ
2
|t−Bb|
)
and Σb =
∑
k∈Sb
βk
(
Wbk +U
b
k
)
+ ξULIBb.
(5)
Here, we adopted the definitions [Wbk]i,j = ωk(i)ω∗k(j)e−
σ2
ψ
+σ2
φ
2
|i−j|
, i, j ∈ {1, . . .Bb}, and Ubk =
(κMTt + κ
BS
r )pτIBb .
Considering the properties of LMMSE estimation, the channel can be decomposed as gk(t) =
gˆk(t)+ ek(t), t = 1, . . . , B, where gˆk(t) denotes the LMMSE channel estimate given in (4) and
ek(t) represents the estimation error. gˆk(t) and ek(t) are mutually uncorrelated and have zero
mean [21, Theorem 1]. The error covariance matrix is given by
E[ek(t)e
H
k (t)] = βk
(
1− βkωHk Θbσ(t)Σ−1b Θbσ(t)ωk
)
IN . (6)
Eqs. (4)-(6) reveal that for |Sb| > 1 and σ2ψ, σ2φ > 0, the channel estimate of the kth MT contains
contributions from channels of other MTs emitting their pilots in the same training sub-phase,
i.e., the pilots interfere with each other although the emitted pilot sequences are orthogonal. This
loss of orthogonality at the receiver is introduced by the phase noise via matrices Θbσ(t) and Wbk,
and can be avoided only by enforcing that in any sub-phase only one MT emits its pilots, i.e.,
|Sb| = 1, 1 ≤ b ≤ Bo. In particular, for the case |Sb| = Bb = 1, 1 ≤ b ≤ Bo = B, for symbol
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9interval t ∈ {B + 1, . . . T}, the LMMSE channel estimate of MT k ∈ Sb can be simplified to
gˆk(t) =
pτβke
−
σ2
ψ
+σ2
φ
2
|t−b|
pτβk(1 + κ
MT
t + κ
BS
r ) + ξ
UL
yUL(b), (7)
with yUL(t) given in (1), i.e., gˆk(t) is not affected by the channels of other MTs despite the
phase noise. The corresponding error covariance matrix simplifies to
E[ek(t)e
H
k (t)] = βk
(
1− pτβke
−(σ2
ψ
+σ2
φ
)|t−b|
pτβk(1 + κ
MT
t + κ
BS
r ) + ξ
UL
)
IN . (8)
Eqs. (4) and (7) reveal that the channel estimate depends on time t. As a consequence, ideally,
the channel-dependent data and AN precoders employed for downlink transmission should be
recomputed in every symbol interval of the data transmission phase, in accordance with the
corresponding channel estimate, which entails a high computational complexity. Therefore, in
the following, we assume that data and AN precoders are computed based on the channel estimate
for one symbol interval t0 (e.g., t0 = B + 1) and are then employed for precoding during the
entire data transmission phase, i.e., for t ∈ {B+1, . . . , T}. For notational conciseness, we denote
the corresponding channel estimate by gˆk = gˆk(t0), k = {1, . . . , K}.
B. Downlink Data Transmission and Linear Precoding
Assuming channel reciprocity, during the downlink data transmission phase, the received signal
at the kth MT in time interval t ∈ {B + 1, . . . , T} is given by
yDLk (t) = g
H
k Θ
H
k (t)(x+ η
BS
t (t)) + η
MT
r,k (t) + ξ
DL
k (t). (9)
In (9), similar to the uplink, ηBSt (t) ∼ CN(0N ,ΥBSt ) and ηMTr,k (t) ∼ CN(0, υMTr,k (t)) denote the
downlink distortion noise [21] at the BS and the kth MT, respectively, where
ΥBSt = κ
BS
t diag (X11, . . . , XNN) and υ
MT
r,k (t) = κ
MT
r g
H
k (t)Xgk(t) (10)
with X = E[xxH ] and Xii = [X]ii, i = 1, . . . , N . Furthermore, ξDLk (t) ∼ CN(0, ξDL) represents
the amplified thermal noise at the kth MT. For simplicity of presentation, we assume that
parameters κBSt , κMTr , and ξDL are identical for all MTs.
The downlink transmit signal x ∈ CN×1 in (9) is modeled as
x =
√
pFs+
√
qAz ∈ CN×1, (11)
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where the data symbol vector s ∈ CK×1 and the AN vector z ∈ CL×1, L ≤ N , are multiplied
by data precoder F ∈ CN×K and AN precoder A ∈ CN×L, respectively. As we assume that
the eavesdropper’s CSI is not available at the BS, AN is injected to degrade the eavesdropper’s
ability to decode the data intended for the MTs [7], [15], [29]. Thereby, it is assumed that the
components of s and z are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian (CSCG) random variables, i.e., s ∼ CN(0K , IK) and z ∼ CN(0L, IL). In (11),
p = φPT/K and q = (1 − φ)PT/L denote the power assigned to each MT and each column
of the AN, where PT is the total power budget and φ ∈ (0, 1] can be used to strike a balance
between data transmission and AN emission. Combining (11) and (9) we obtain
yDLk (t) =
√
pgHk (t)fksk+
K∑
l 6=k
√
pgHk (t)flsl+
√
qgHk (t)Az+g
H
k (t)η
BS
t (t)+η
MT
r,k (t)+ξ
DL
k (t), (12)
where sk and fk denote the kth element of s and the kth column of matrix F, respectively.
C. Signal Model of the Eavesdropper
We assume that the eavesdropper is silent during the training phase, i.e., for t ∈ {1, . . . , B},
and eavesdrops the signal intended for MT k during the data transmission phase, i.e., for
t ∈ {B + 1, . . . , T}. Let GE denote the channel matrix between the BS and the eavesdropper
with i.i.d. zero-mean complex Gaussian elements having variance βE , where βE is the path-
loss between the BS and the eavesdropper. Since the capabilities of the eavesdropper are not
known at the BS, we make worst-case assumptions regarding the hardware and signal processing
capabilities of the eavesdropper with respect to communication secrecy. In particular, we assume
the received signal at the eavesdropper at time t ∈ {B + 1, . . . , T} can be modelled as
yE(t) = G
H
EΨ
H(t)(x+ ηBSt (t)) ∈ CNE×1, (13)
where Ψ(t) = diag
(
ejψ1(t)1T1×N/No , . . . , e
jψNo(t)1T1×N/No
)
. Thereby, we assumed that the eaves-
dropper employs high-quality hardware such that the only HWIs are the phase noise and the
additive distortion noise at the BS. Eq. (13) also implies that the thermal noise at the eavesdropper
is negligibly small [7], [15], [29]. Furthermore, we assume that the eavesdropper has perfect
CSI, i.e., it can perfectly estimate the effective eavesdropper channel matrix GHEΨH(t), and can
perfectly decode and cancel the interference caused by all MTs except for the MT of interest
August 11, 2016 DRAFT
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[7], [15], [29]. These worst-case assumptions lead to an upper bound on the ergodic capacity of
the eavesdropper in time interval t given by
CE(t) = E[log2(1 + γE(t))] (14)
where
γE(t) = pg
k
E(t)
(
GHEΨ
H(t)(qAAH +ΥBSt )Ψ(t)GE
)−1
(gkE(t))
H (15)
and gkE(t) = fHk Ψ(t)GE . We note that since we assumed that the thermal noise at the receiver of
the eavesdropper is negligible, γE(t), and consequently CE(t), are independent of the path-loss
of the eavesdropper, βE . Furthermore, we observe from (15) that the additive distortion noise at
the BS, ηBSt (t), with co-variance matrix ΥBSt , affects the ergodic capacity of the eavesdropper
in a similar manner as the injected AN.
III. ACHIEVABLE ERGODIC SECRECY RATE IN THE PRESENCE OF HWIS
In this section, we analyze the achievable ergodic secrecy rate of a massive MIMO system
employing non-ideal hardware. To this end, we derive a lower bound on the achievable ergodic
secrecy rate in Section III-A, and present an asymptotic analysis for the downlink data rate of
the legitimate MTs when MF data precoding is adopted by the BS in Section III-B. In Section
III-C, a generalized NS AN precoder is proposed to avoid the AN leakage caused by phase noise
for conventional NS AN precoding. Finally, in Section III-D, a simple closed-form upper bound
for the eavesdropper’s capacity for the new AN precoder is presented.
A. Lower Bound on Achievable Ergodic Secrecy Rate
In this paper, we assume that communication delay is tolerable and coding over many inde-
pendent channel realizations is possible. Hence, we adopt the ergodic secrecy rate achieved by
a given MT as performance metric [29].
Before analyzing the secrecy rate, we first employ [26, Lemma 1] to obtain a lower bound on
the achievable rate for the multiple-input single-output (MISO) phase noise channel given by (9).
In particular, the achievable rate of the kth MT, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, in symbol interval t ∈ {B+1, . . . , T}
is lower bounded by
Rk(t) ≥ Rk(t) = log2(1 + γk(t)), (16)
August 11, 2016 DRAFT
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with SINR γk(t) =
p
∣∣E [gHk (t)fk]∣∣2
K∑
l=1
pE
[
|gHk (t)fl|2
]
− p |E [gHk (t)fk]|2 + E
[
gHk (t)(qAA
H +ΥBSt )gk(t)
]
+ E
[
υMTk,r (t)
]
+ ξDL
.
(17)
The expectation operator in (17) is taken with respect to channel vectors, gk, as well as the
phase noise processes, ψl(t) and φk(t). The rate given in (16) is achievable because: 1) The
SINR in (17) is underestimated by assuming that only the BS has channel estimates, while
the MTs only know the mean of the effective channel gain
∣∣E [gHk (t)fk]∣∣ and employ it for
signal detection. The deviation from the average effective channel gain is treated as Gaussian
noise having variance E
[∣∣gHk (t)fk∣∣2]−|E [gHk (t)fk] |2, cf. [5], [7], [15], [20]; 2) Following [26,
Lemma 1], we treat the multiuser interference and distortion noises as independent Gaussian
noises, which is a worst-case assumption for the calculation of the mutual information. The
tightness of the bound will be confirmed in Section V. Based on (16), we provide a lower bound
on the achievable ergodic secrecy rate of the kth MT, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1: The achievable ergodic secrecy rate of the kth MT, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, is bounded below
by
Rseck ≥ Rseck =
1
T
∑
t∈{B+1,...,T}
[Rk(t)− CE(t)]+ , (18)
where Rk(t), 1 ≤ k ≤ K, is the lower bound of the achievable ergodic rate of the kth MT given
in (16) and CE(t) is the ergodic capacity between the BS and the eavesdropper given in (14).
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.
The sum in (18) is over the T − B time slots used for data transmission. Motivated by the
coding scheme for the non-secrecy case in [30], a similar coding scheme that supports the secrecy
rate given in (18) is described as follows. For a given t ∈ {B+1, . . . , T}, the statistics of gk(t)
in (17) given the estimate gˆk are identical across all coherence intervals and the corresponding
channel realizations are i.i.d. Hence, we employ T −B parallel channel codes for each MT; one
code for each time t ∈ {B + 1, . . . , T}, i.e., the tth channel code is employed across the tth
time slots of multiple coherence intervals. Then, at each MT, the tth received symbols across
the multiple coherence intervals are jointly decoded [30]. With this coding strategy the ergodic
secrecy rate given in (18) is achieved provided the parallel codes span sufficiently many (ideally
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an infinite number) of independent channel realizations gk and phase noise samples ψl(t) and
φk(t).
B. Asymptotic Analysis of Achievable Rate for MF Precoding
In this subsection, we analyze the lower bound on the achievable ergodic rate of the kth MT,
1 ≤ k ≤ K, in (16) in the asymptotic limit N,K →∞ for fixed ratio β = K/N . Thereby, we
adopt MF precoding at the BS, i.e., fk = gˆk/‖gˆk‖, as is commonly done for massive MIMO
systems because of complexity concerns for more sophisticated precoder designs. In the following
Lemma, we provide a closed-form expression for the gain of the desired signal.
Lemma 2: For MF precoding at the BS, the numerator of (17) reflecting the gain of the desired
signal at MT k ∈ Sb, 1 ≤ b ≤ Bo, can be expressed as
E
[
gHk Θ
H
k (t)fk
]
=
√
βkNλk · e−
σ2
ψ
+σ2
φ
2
|t−t0|, where λk = βkω
H
k Θ
b
σ(t0)
Σ−1b Θ
b
σ(t0)
ωk. (19)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C.
The term e−
σ2
ψ
+σ2
φ
2
|t−t0| in (19) reveals the impact of the accumulated phase noise from the time
of channel estimation, t0, to the time of data transmission, t, on the received signal strength at
MT k. On the other hand, the phase noise within the training phase affects λk, and consequently
the received signal strength, via Θbσ(t0) and Σb, cf. (5), when multiple pilot sequences are
simultaneously emitted in a given training sub-phase. In contrast, when TO pilots are adopted,
i.e., only a single user emits pilots in each training sub-phase and Bb = 1, 1 ≤ b ≤ B, λk in
(19) reduces to λk = pτβkpτβk(1+κMTt +κBSr )+ξUL and is not affected by the phase noise.
Next, an expression for the multiuser interference power in the first term of the denominator
of (17) is derived.
Lemma 3: When MF precoding is adopted at the BS, the power of the multiuser interference
caused by the signal intended for the lth MT, l 6= k, at MT k ∈ Sb, 1 ≤ b ≤ Bo, is given by
E
[∣∣gHk ΘHk (t)fl∣∣2] =
(
βk +
(
X
(1)
k,l +X
(2)
k,l +X
(3)
k,l
)(1− ǫ
No
+ ǫ
))
, if l ∈ Sb (20)
and by βk otherwise. Here, ǫ = e−σ
2
ψ
|t−t0|
, X
(1)
k,l =
β2
k
ω
H
l
Θb
σ(t0)
Σ
−1
b
Ub
k
Σ
−1
b
Θb
σ(t0)
ωl
ω
H
l
Θb
σ(t0)
Σ
−1
b
Θb
σ(t0)
ωl
, X
(2)
k,l =
N
No
·
β2
k
ω
H
l
Θb
σ(t0)
Σ
−1
b
Wb
k
Σ
−1
b
Θb
σ(t0)
ωl
ω
H
l
Θb
σ(t0)
Σ
−1
b
Θb
σ(t0)
ωl
, and X(3)k,l = N
(
1− 1
No
)
·
∣∣∣∣βkωHk Θbσ(t0)Σ−1b Θbσ(t0)ωl
∣∣∣∣
2
ω
H
l
Θb
σ(t0)
Σ
−1
b
Θb
σ(t0)
ωl
.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix D.
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Lemma 3 confirms that when the number of BS antennas is sufficiently large, i.e., N →∞,
as long as l /∈ Sb, the impact of the multiuser interference from the lth MT vanishes, as is
commonly assumed in the massive MIMO literature, e.g. [3], [4]. However, the same is not true
for MTs that emit pilots in the same training sub-phase as MT k, i.e., MTs l ∈ Sb. Because of
the impairment incurred by the phase noise during the training phase, the interference power of
these MTs grows linearly with N and does not vanish compared to the strength of the desired
signal in (19) in the limit of N →∞.
Furthermore, for the summand with l = k in the sum in the first term of the denominator of
(17), we obtain E
[∣∣gHk ΘHk (t)fk∣∣2] =
E
[
tr
(
gk(t0)g
H
k (t0)Ψ
H
t0 (t)
gˆkgˆ
H
k
‖gˆk‖2Ψt0(t)
)]
= βk + βk(N − 1)λk
(
1− ǫ
No
+ ǫ
)
, (21)
where k ∈ Sb and Ψt0(t) is defined in Appendix C. The last equality in (21) is obtained
by applying Theorem 1 in Appendix A [34]. The variance of the gain of the desired signal,
gHk Θ
H
k (t)fk, is obtained by subtracting the right hand side of (21) from the square of the right
hand side of (19).
The two terms in the denominator of (17) originating from the HWIs at the BS and the kth
MT, i.e., ηBSt (t) and ηMTr,k (t), respectively, can be calculated as
E
[∣∣gHk ΘHk (t)ΥBSt Θk(t)gk∣∣] = βkκBSt PT and E [υMTr,k (t)] = βkκMTr PT . (22)
Substituting the results in (19)-(22) into (17), we obtain the received SINR at MT k ∈ Sb in
symbol interval t as
γk(t) =
pNβkλk
pβk(ak + ck) + qL
k
AN + βk(κ
BS
t + κ
MT
r )PT + ξ
DL
, (23)
with
ak =
∑
l∈Sb
(
1 +
(
X
(1)
k,l +X
(2)
k,l +X
(3)
k,l
)(1− ǫ
No
+ ǫ
)
/βk
)
+ (K − |Sb|), (24)
ck =
(
1− 1
No
)
(1− ǫ) + [(N − 1)λk + 1]
(
1− ǫ
No
+ ǫ
)
−Nλk, (25)
where λk = λke−(σ
2
ψ
+σ2
φ
)|t−t0|
. Furthermore, ak and ck represent the multiuser interference re-
ceived at the kth MT and the variance of the gain of the desired signal, respectively. Moreover,
the term LkAN = E
[
gHk Θ
H
k (t)AA
HΘk(t)gk
]
in (23) represents the AN leakage in the received
signal of the kth MT in time slot t. This term will be characterized in detail for the considered
AN precoders in Section III-C.
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C. Generalized NS AN Precoding
The AN leakage term LkAN in (23) depends on the particular AN precoder used. Therefore, in
this subsection, we first evaluate LkAN for the conventional NS precoder, where A is designed
to lie in the NS of the estimated channel vectors of all MTs, gˆk, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, which is the most
common design used in the literature [7], [15], [29]. Subsequently, we propose and analyze the
G-NS AN precoder design which is less sensitive to HWIs than the conventional NS design.
The AN leakage incurred by the conventional NS AN precoder is given in the following
Lemma.
Lemma 4: For the conventional NS AN precoder, where L = N −K [7], [15], [29], the AN
leakage power received at MT k ∈ Sb in time interval t is given by
LkAN = βk(N −K)
((
1− 1
No
)
(1− ǫ) + 1− λk
)
. (26)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix E.
In Lemma 4, the terms ǫ and λk reflect the negative impact of the HWIs on the AN power
leakage. If only one LO is employed, i.e., No = 1, the impact of ǫ is eliminated. However,
the negative effect of ǫ increases as the number of LOs, No, increases since the phase noise
processes of different LOs are independent destroying the orthogonality of the columns of A
and gk(t), 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
This problem can be mitigated by employing Mo NS AN precoders where each precoder
encodes the data signals intended for the antennas connected to No/Mo LOs. Thereby, No is
assumed to be a multiple of Mo, i.e., No/Mo ∈ Z. The resulting AN preorder is referred to as G-
NS AN precoder. More in detail, for the G-NS AN precoder, we divide each channel estimation
vector, gˆk, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, into Mo sub-vectors
gˆk =
[ (
gˆ
(1)
k
)T
,
(
gˆ
(2)
k
)T
, . . . ,
(
gˆ
(Mo)
k
)T ]T
, (27)
where gˆ(m)k ∈ CN/Mo×1, which contains the ((m − 1)N/Mo + 1)th to the (mN/Mo)th elements
of gˆk for 1 ≤ m ≤Mo. Correspondingly, we split matrix A into Mo sub-matrices as follows
A =
[
AT(1),A
T
(2) . . . ,A
T
(Mo)
]T
, (28)
with A(m) ∈ CN/Mo×(N/Mo−K), 1 ≤ m ≤Mo, i.e., we have L = N/Mo −K. Now, matrix A(m)
is designed to lie in the null-space of gˆ(m)k , 1 ≤ k ≤ K, i.e., A(m)gˆ(m)k = 0, 1 ≤ k ≤ K,
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1 ≤ m ≤ Mo. For Mo = 1, the G-NS precoder simplifies to the conventional NS precoder.
On the other hand, for Mo = No, the antennas connected to each LO have their own NS AN
precoder.
The AN leakage of the G-NS precoder is analyzed in the following Lemma.
Lemma 5: For the G-NS AN precoder, where L = N/Mo −K and 1 ≤ Mo ≤ No, the AN
leakage power received at MT k ∈ Sb in time interval t is given by
LkAN = βk
(
N
Mo
−K
)((
1− Mo
No
)
(1− ǫ) + 1− λk
)
. (29)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix F.
Several observations can be made from (29). First, we note that, as expected, for Mo = 1,
(29) reduces to (26). Second, the negative impact of the phase noise via ǫ on the AN leakage
can be completely eliminated by choosing Mo = No. Third, the G-NS precoder requires the
calculation of Mo null spaces of dimension N/Mo ×K. Hence, the computational complexity
increases with Mo. We will elaborate on the optimal choice of Mo in Sections IV and V.
Remark 1: We note that the proposed G-NS AN precoder is not optimal for the maximization of
the achievable secrecy rate. Nevertheless, the G-NS AN precoder achieves high performance and
facilitates the derivation of closed-form expressions for the achievable secrecy rate, which provide
substantial technical insight for system design. Optimizing the AN precoder for maximization
of the secrecy rate [35] is an interesting topic for future work.
The achievable rates of MT k ∈ Sb in time slot t with conventional NS and G-NS precoding
are obtained by inserting (26) and (29) into (23), respectively. Hence, for the proposed G-NS
precoder, we obtain
Rk(t) = log2
(
1 +
λkφN
(ak + ck − βµk)φ+ βµk + ξk
)
, (30)
where µk = ( NMo − K)
((
1− Mo
No
)
(1− ǫ) + 1− λk
)
, ξk = β(κ
MT
r + κ
BS
t + ξ
DL/(βkPT )), and
β = K/N > 0.
D. Upper Bound on the Eavesdropper’s Capacity
In the following Proposition, we provide a tight and tractable upper bound on eavesdropper’s
capacity.
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Proposition 1: For N → ∞ and (G-)NS AN precoding, the eavesdropper’s capacity in (14)
can be upper bounded as
CE(t) ≤ CE = log2
(
1 +
pNE
qL+ κBSt PT − χNE
)
, with χ =
(1 + κBSt )
2q2L+ (κBSt )
2p2K
(1 + κBSt )qL+ κ
BS
t pK
,
(31)
for qL+ κBSt PT > χNE , and where L = N −K and L = N/Mo −K for the conventional NS
and the G-NS precoders, respectively.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix G.
We observe from (31) that, as expected, the capacity of the eavesdropper is increasing in the
number of its equipped antennas, NE . Another non-trivial observation is that the bound provided
in Proposition 1 is no longer a function of time slot index t, due to the worst-case assumption
that the eavesdropper has perfect instantaneous CSI, cf. Section II-C. Interestingly, when no AN
is injected, i.e., q = 0, (31) reduces to
CE
∣∣∣∣
q=0
= log2
(
1 +
NE
κBSt (K −NE)
)
, (32)
for K > NE . For perfect BS hardware, we have κBSt → 0 and CE → ∞ making secure
communication impossible. Hence, if AN is not injected, HWIs may in fact be beneficial for
secure communication as the distortion noise at the BS acts like AN and may facilitate secrecy.
This surprising insight will be studied more carefully in the next section. Furthermore, the number
of independent distortion noise processes at the BS is equal to the number of users, K. Hence,
K > NE is needed to prevent the eavesdropper from nulling out the distortion noise and for
achieving secrecy.
The worst-case ergodic secrecy rate achieved by MT k in time slot t is lower bounded by[
Rk(t)−CE
]+
, where Rk(t) and CE are given in (30) and (31), respectively. Hence, although
the CSI and location information of the eavesdropper assumed to be not available at the BS,
with the proposed transmission strategy, the BS can still guarantee the derived worst-case ergodic
secrecy rate in the presence of HWIs. In non-worst-case scenarios, higher ergodic secrecy rates
are expected.
IV. GUIDELINES FOR SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section, we exploit the analytical results derived in the previous section to gain some
insight into the impact of the various system and HWI parameters on system design. To this end,
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we carefully study the closed-form lower bound on the achievable ergodic secrecy rate obtained
by combining (18), (30), and (31).
A. Design of the Pilot Sequences
Assuming that we assign the maximum number of users to each training sub-phase, i.e.,
|Sb| = Bb, the relevant design parameter for the pilot sequences is the number of training sub-
phases Bo, or equivalently, the size of the training sub-phases Bb as
∑Bo
b=1Bb = B. In particular,
Bb affects the lower bound on the achievable ergodic rate of MT k in (30) via λk, ak, and ck,
where ck becomes proportional to λk for N → ∞, cf. (25). Thereby, close inspection of (19)
reveals that λk, which reflects the power of the received useful signal, is not monotonic in Bb.
This can be explained as follows. On the one hand, since the power of each pilot symbol is
constrained, i.e., |ωk(t)|2 = pτ , ∀k, t, the sum power of the pilot sequence per MT increases
with Bb. On the other hand, for larger Bb, more MTs are allowed to emit pilots in training
sub-phase b introducing more mutual pilot interference due to phase noise. This has an adverse
effect on the quality of the channel estimate and consequently on the power of the received
useful signal. Similarly, close inspection of (24) reveals that ak, which reflects the multiuser
interference incurred to the kth MT, is a monotonically increasing function of Bb, as a lower
channel estimation accuracy caused by more mutual pilot interference, gives rise to stronger
multiuser interference. Considering the behaviour of λk, ak, and ck and their impact on the
achievable ergodic rate of MT k in (30), we conclude that Bb, 1 ≤ b ≤ Bo, should be optimized
and the optimal value depends on the channel and HWI parameters. Thereby, the optimal Bb is
decreasing in the phase noise variances, σ2ψ and σ2φ, as the degradation introduced by concurrent
pilot emission by multiple MTs is increasing in these parameters. This conclusion will be verified
in Section V-B by numerically evaluating (18).
B. Selection of Mo for G-NS AN Precoding
The number of G-NS AN precoding sub-matrices, Mo, 1 ≤ Mo ≤ No, employed affects the
achievable ergodic secrecy rate via the AN leakage LkAN in (29) and via the (bound on the)
eavesdropper capacity CE in (31). The AN leakage is a decreasing function with respect to Mo,
i.e., as far as the AN leakage is concerned, Mo = No is preferable. On the other hand, since the
dimensionality of the G-NS AN precoder is given by L = N/Mo−K, the eavesdropper capacity
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is an increasing function of Mo, cf. (31), which has a negative effect on the ergodic secrecy rate.
Hence, Mo has to be optimized. Since the eavesdropper capacity does not depend on the phase
noise, we expect that the optimal Mo increases with increasing BS phase noise variance, σ2ψ, as
σ2ψ affects the AN leakage via ǫ in (29). This conjecture will be numerically verified in Section
V-D.
C. Secrecy in the Absence of AN
In [7], [15] it was shown that if perfect hardware is employed, injection of AN is necessary to
achieve secrecy. In particular, without AN generation, under worst-case assumptions regarding
the noise at the eavesdropper, the eavesdropper capacity is unbounded. On the other hand, we
showed in Section III-D that in the presence of HWIs the eavesdropper capacity is bounded
since the distortion noise generated at the BS has a similar effect as AN. Motivated by this
observation, in this section, we calculate the maximum number of eavesdropper antennas NE
that can be tolerated if a positive secrecy rate is desired without AN emission.
If AN is not emitted, we have φ = 1 or q = 0. In this case, the proposed lower bound on the
ergodic secrecy rate of the kth MT in time interval t simplifies to
Rseck (t)
∣∣∣∣
q=0
=
[
log2
(
1 +
λkN
ak + ck + ξk
)
− log2
(
1 +
α
κBSt (β − α)
)]+
. (33)
where α = NE/N denotes the normalized number of eavesdropper antennas. In the following
Proposition, we provide a condition for the number of eavesdropper antennas that has to be met
for secure communication to be possible.
Proposition 2: If AN is not generated, the maximum number of eavesdropper antennas that
the kth MT can tolerate while achieving a positive ergodic secrecy rate is NE = ⌊αANN⌋, where
αAN =
λkNκ
BS
t β
λkNκ
BS
t + ak + ck + ξk
∣∣∣
t=B+1
. (34)
Proof: First, we note that Rk(t) is a decreasing function of t. Hence, considering (18), it is
sufficient to ensure Rk(B + 1) > CE for achieving a positive ergodic secrecy rate. Eq. (34) is
obtained by setting (33) to zero and observing that Rseck (t)
∣∣∣∣
q=0
is a decreasing function of α.
Eq. (34) clearly shows that the additive distortion noise at the BS is essential for achieving
a positive secrecy rate if AN is not injected as αAN = 0 results if κBSt = 0. On the other hand,
αAN is a decreasing function of all other HWI parameters, i.e., κBSr , κMTt , κMTr , ξDL, σ2ψ, and
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σ2ψ, as the corresponding HWIs affect only the achievable ergodic rate of the MT but not the
ergodic capacity of the eavesdropper. We note that αAN is an increasing function of β since the
dimensionality of the additive distortion noise at the BS is proportional to β.
D. Maximum Number of Eavesdropper Antennas
Now, we consider the maximum number of eavesdropper antennas that can be tolerated if a
positive ergodic secrecy rate is desired and AN injection is possible. Combining (18), (30), and
(31), the lower bound on the ergodic secrecy rate in time interval t can be expressed as
Rseck (t) =
[
log2
(
1 +
λkφN
(ak + ck)φ+ βµk(1− φ) + ξk
)
− log2
(
1 +
αφ
β(1− φ+ κBSt − χ′α)
)]+
,
(35)
where χ′ = (1+κ
BS
t )
2(1−φ)2N/L+(κBSt )
2φ2/β
1−φ+κBSt
.
Proposition 3: If AN injection is possible, a positive secrecy rate can be achieved by the kth
MT if the number of eavesdropper antennas does not exceed NE = ⌊αsecN⌋, where
αsec =
(1 + κBSt )λkL
L/N(µk + κMTr + κ
BS
t + ξ
DL/(βkPT )) + λkN(1 + κBSt )
∣∣∣
t=B+1
(36)
and φ→ 0, i.e., almost all transmit power is employed for AN generation.
Proof: Exploiting again that Rk(t) is a decreasing function of t it suffices to consider the
ergodic secrecy rate for t = B + 1. Then, an expression for αsec is obtained by setting Rseck (t)
in (35) to zero. This expression is monotonically decreasing in φ and hence can be further
simplified by letting φ→ 0 which yields (36).
Proposition 3 reveals that, as expected, the number of eavesdropper antennas that can be
tolerated increases with the channel estimation accuracy (i.e., λk) and the number of spatial
dimensions available for AN (i.e., L). Furthermore, similar to αAN, αsec is a decreasing function
of the HWI parameters κBSr , κMTt , κMTr , ξDL, σ2ψ, and σ2ψ, and an increasing function of κBSt .
However, unlike αAN, αsec is independent of β.
E. Number of LOs
The number of LOs, No, affects the ergodic secrecy rate via the terms ak, ck, and µk in the
achievable ergodic rate in (30). For N →∞, ak and ck are decreasing functions of No, i.e., less
multiple access interference is caused if more LOs are employed, whereas the AN leakage term
µk is an increasing function in No. Therefore, considering the specific form of the denominator
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of the fraction inside the logarithm in (30), the optimal value of No, which maximizes the ergodic
secrecy rate, depends on φ. In particular, for a given Mo, for φ = 1 no AN is injected and µk
cancels in the expression for the achievable ergodic rate in (30). Hence, in this case, the ergodic
secrecy rate is a monotonically increasing function of No, i.e., increasing the number of LOs is
beneficial. On the other hand, for a given Mo, for φ < 1, the optimal No maximizing the ergodic
secrecy rate can be found by performing a numerical search based on (30).
We note that by employing G-NS AN generation and enforcing Mo = No, we can avoid the
harmful effect of the multiple LOs on the AN leakage term µk. In this case, the achievable
ergodic rate of the MT becomes an increasing function of Mo = No. However, at the same time,
the number of dimensions available for AN injection, L = N/Mo−K, is a decreasing function
of Mo = No. Therefore, the optimal Mo = No maximizing the ergodic secrecy rate has to be
found again by a numerical search.
F. Are HWIs Beneficial for Security?
Since the HWI parameters κBSr , κMTt , κMTr , ξDL, σ2ψ , and σ2ψ only affect the legitimate user but
not the eavesdropper, the corresponding HWIs are always detrimental to the ergodic secrecy rate.
However, the additive distortion noise at the BS affects both the achievable ergodic rate of the
MT and the capacity of the eavesdropper. Hence, it is not a priori clear if this HWI is beneficial
or detrimental to the ergodic secrecy rate. The following Proposition provides a criterion for
judging the benefits of the additive BS distortion noise.
Proposition 4: For time interval t, non-zero additive BS distortion noise with small κBSt > 0,
κBSt → 0, is beneficial for the achievable ergodic secrecy rate of the kth MT if and only if
(1− φ)[1−NE/L− (1−NE/L−NE/K)φ]× 1−NE/L
1− (1− 2φ)NE/L <
αγ(Nλkφ+ γ)
β2λkN
, (37)
where γ = (ak + ck)φ+ βµk(1− φ) + β(κMTr + ξDL/(βkPT )).
Proof: For additive BS distortion noise to be beneficial for a given time interval t and small
κBSt > 0, the derivative ∂Rseck (t)/∂κBSt at κBSt = 0 has to be positive. Assuming Rseck (t) > 0,
this condition leads to ∂Rk(t)/∂κBSt |κBSt =0 > ∂CE/∂κBSt |κBSt =0, which can be further simplified
to (37).
Remark 2 : We note that the criterion in Proposition 4 only guarantees that additive BS
distortion noise with small positive κBSt is beneficial. The ergodic secrecy rate, Rseck (t), is in
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general not monotonic in κBSt and larger κBSt may be harmful even if small κBSt are beneficial,
see Section V-E. Furthermore, since the right hand side of (37) is always positive, we conclude
that additive BS distortion noise with small κBSt is always beneficial when φ = 1, i.e., when AN
is not injected.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we provide numerical and simulation results to verify the analysis presented
in Sections III and IV and to illustrate the impact of HWIs on the ergodic secrecy rate. For
the numerical results, we numerically evaluate the analytical expression for the lower bound
on the ergodic secrecy rate obtained by combining (18), (30), and (31). For the simulation
results, we employ Monte Carlo simulation and evaluate (18) using Rseck (t) = log2(1 + γk(t))
and CE(t) = log2(1+γE(t)) with γk(t) and γE(t) given by (17) and (15), respectively, for 5, 000
independent channel realizations. For simplicity, in this section, we assume that the path-loss
for all MTs is identical 2, i.e., βk = 1, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, and the coherence block length is equal
to T = 500 time slots. Typical values for the phase noise increment standard deviations, σψ,
σφ, used include 0.06◦, which was adopted in the long-term evolution (LTE) specifications [33],
and 6◦, which corresponds to strong phase noise according to [31], [32]. Furthermore, typical
values for the additive distortion noise κMTt = κBSr = κBSt = κMTr include {0, 0.052, 0.152} [21],
whereas the amplified receiver noise was set to ξUL = ξDL = 1.58σ2n [26], with σ2n = 1. The
specific values of the adopted system and HWI parameters are provided in the captions of the
figures.
A. Capacity of Eavesdropper for G-NS AN Precoding
Fig. 2 depicts the eavesdropper’s ergodic capacity, CE , as a function of β for G-NS AN
precoding with Mo = {1, 2, 4}. Besides results for the analytical upper bound, CE, from (31),
we also show simulation results for CE by averaging log2(1 + γE) over 5, 000 independent
channel realizations, where γE is given by (15). From Fig. 2 we observe that the proposed upper
2Although the analytical results presented in this paper are valid for unequal path-losses, for the presented numerical results,
we employ equal path-losses in order to be able to focus on the impact of HWIs on the achievable ergodic secrecy rate. The
investigation of this impact is the main objective of this paper, and unequal path-losses do not provide any additional insights
in this regard.
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Fig. 2. Capacity of the eavesdropper vs. the normalized
number of MTs β for a system with N = 128, No = 4,
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bound on the capacity of the eavesdropper is very tight. Furthermore, as expected, the ergodic
capacity of the eavesdropper is an increasing function of Mo since the number of dimensions
available for AN generation, L = N/Mo − K, is a decreasing function of Mo. In fact, since
L = N/Mo −K > NE is needed for successfully jamming the eavesdropper, for Mo = 4, we
depict the ergodic capacity of the eavesdropper only for β < 0.125. Nevertheless, as will be
shown below, choosing Mo > 1 may still be beneficial as far as the ergodic secrecy rate is
concerned as the achievable ergodic rate of the MT is an increasing function of Mo.
B. Achievable Ergodic Rate of MT for Different Pilot Designs
Next, we investigate the impact of the general pilot designs introduced in Section II-A on
the lower bound of the achievable ergodic rate of the considered MT given in (30)3. Note that
the capacity of the eavesdropper is not affected by the pilot design. For simplicity, we assume
equal duration for all training sub-phases, Bb = B/Bo, b ∈ {1, . . . , Bo}, and B = K. The same
3We note that all results obtained by numerically evaluating the analytical expressions derived in this paper were verified by
simulations. However, the simulation results are not included in all figures for clarity of presentation.
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number of users is assigned to each training sub-phase. In Fig. 3, we show the achievable ergodic
rate of a MT in training set SBo as well as the corresponding λk, which reflects the power of the
received useful signal, and ak, which reflects the multiuser interference. Results for Bo = 1 (SO
pilots), Bo = 2, and Bo = 16 (TO pilots) are shown. As predicted in Section IV-A, the multiuser
interference, ak, is monotonically decreasing in Bo as larger Bo improve the robustness against
phase noise during the channel estimation phase, which allows better suppression of multiuser
interference via MF precoding. Somewhat surprisingly, for σψ = σφ ≤ 5◦, ak is a decreasing
function of the phase noise variance. This may be attributed to the fact that phase noise prevents
the coherent superposition of the multiuser interference generated by different MTs such that
large interference values are avoided. On the other hand, for σψ = σφ > 5◦, the detrimental effects
of the pilot interference caused by the loss of orthogonality for Bo < 16 outweigh this positive
effect and ak increases with the phase noise variance. For λk, i.e., the received signal power, we
observe from Fig. 3 that the optimal Bo depends on the phase noise variance. In particular, for
small phase noise variances, small Bo are preferable since the increased pilot power outweighs
the loss of orthogonality during training. On the other hand, for large phase noise variances,
eventually TO pilots become optimal as the preserved orthogonality during training becomes
crucial. The behaviour of λk and ak is also reflected in the behaviour of the achievable rate of
the considered MT. In particular, for the considered system parameters, Bo = 1, Bo = 2, and
Bo = 16 are optimal for σψ = σφ ≤ 6◦, 6◦ < σψ = σφ ≤ 21◦, and σψ = σφ > 21◦ (which is not
a practical range), respectively. Hence, in practice, the optimal Bo can be found by evaluating
(30).
C. Optimal Power Allocation to Data and AN
Fig. 4 shows the achievable ergodic secrecy rate as a function of the power allocation parameter
φ for SO and TO pilots and different phase noise variances. G-NS AN precoding with Mo =
No = 2 is adopted. The curve for ideal hardware components, i.e., κBSt = κBSr = κMTt = κMTr =
σψ = σφ = 0, is also provided for reference. We investigate the optimal power allocation between
data transmission and AN emission for the maximization of the ergodic secrecy rate achieved
for different phase noise levels. When the phase noise variance is small, i.e., σψ = σφ = 0.6◦,
SO pilots outperforms TO pilots for all values of φ. However, this is not true for stronger phase
noise. We also observe that the optimal value for φ maximizing the ergodic secrecy rate is only
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The optimal φ is adopted.
weakly dependent on the phase noise variance.
D. Achievable Ergodic Secrecy Rate with G-NS AN Precoding
In Fig. 5, we show the ergodic secrecy rate achieved with G-NS AN precoding for different
values of Mo as a function of the number of BS antennas. The cases of weak (σψ = σφ = 0.6◦)
and strong (σψ = σφ = 6◦) phase noise are considered. For weak phase noise, using large values
of Mo becomes beneficial only for large numbers of antennas, i.e., N > 200, as for smaller
numbers of antennas the positive effect of larger values of Mo on the AN leakage is outweighed
by their negative effect on the number of spatial dimensions available for AN precoding. On
the other hand, for strong phase noise, the AN leakage is larger and its mitigation by choosing
Mo = No = 16 is beneficial already for N > 150. These observations are in line with our
theoretical considerations in Section IV-B. Fig. 5 also confirms the accuracy of the derived
analytical expressions for the ergodic secrecy rate.
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E. Maximum Tolerable Number of Eavesdropper Antennas
Fig. 6 depicts the (normalized) maximum tolerable number of eavesdropper antennas for
achieving a positive ergodic secrecy rate for the case without AN generation, αAN, and the case
with AN generation, αsec, as a function of the (normalized) number of users, β. Results for
channel estimation based on SO and TO pilots as well as the case of no phase noise (σψ =
σφ = 0
◦) are shown for No = 2 and No = 4 LOs. First, we note that, as expected from our
considerations in Section IV-E, for the case without AN (φ = 1), increasing No from 2 to 4 is
beneficial, i.e., the number of tolerable eavesdropper antennas increases. In contrast, if AN is
injected, No = 2 is preferable. Second, AN generation is beneficial and improves the robustness
against eavesdropping, i.e., αsec > αAN. Third, as expected from Sections IV-C and IV-D, αAN
is a monotonically increasing function of β whereas αsec is independent of β. Fourth, for the
considered example of weak phase noise, SO pilots outperform the TO pilots for all considered
cases.
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F. Is Additive Distortion Noise at the BS Beneficial for Security?
In Fig. 7, we show the achievable ergodic secrecy rate as a function of the BS distortion noise
parameter, κBSt , for different phase noise variances and different power allocation factors φ. For
comparison, the achievable ergodic secrecy rates without BS distortion noise (i.e., κBSt = 0)
are also shown. Fig. 7 shows that if the power allocated to AN is substantial (e.g., φ = 0.05),
the additional distortion noise has a negative effect on the ergodic secrecy rate. On the other
hand, if the power assigned for AN is not sufficient (e.g., φ = 0.25), non-zero additive distortion
noise at the BS is beneficial as the distortion noise acts like additional AN. In particular, for
φ = 0.25, σψ = 0.06
◦
, we obtain for the left hand side and right hand side of (37) 0.52 and
1.66, respectively, which we represent as (0.52, 1.66). Correspondingly, we obtain for φ = 0.25,
σψ = 6
◦ and φ = 0.05, σψ = 0.06◦ and φ = 0.05, σψ = 6◦ the tupels (0.52, 2.53) and (0.80, 0.16)
and (0.80, 0.35), respectively. These values and the results in Fig. 7 suggest that (37) can indeed
be used to predict whether or not BS distortion noise is beneficial.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the impact of HWIs such as multiplicative phase noise,
additive distortion noise, and amplified receiver noise on the secrecy performance of massive
MIMO systems employing MF precoding for downlink data transmission. To mitigate the loss
of pilot orthogonality during uplink training if multiple MTs emit pilots concurrently, a gen-
eralized pilot design was proposed. Furthermore, to avoid the AN leakage caused by the loss
of orthogonality between the user channels and the NS AN precoder if multiple noisy LOs are
employed at the BS, a novel G-NS AN precoding scheme was introduced. For the considered
system, a lower bound on the achievable ergodic secrecy rate of the users was derived. This
bound was used to obtain important insights for system design, including the impact of the pilot
sequence design, the AN precoder design, the number of LOs, and the various HWI parameters.
The following general conclusions can be drawn: 1) Additive distortion noise at the BS may
be beneficial for the secrecy performance especially if little or no AN is injected; 2) all other
HWIs have a negative impact on the ergodic secrecy rate; 3) despite their susceptibility to pilot
interference in the presence of phase noise, SO pilots are preferable except for the case when the
phase noise is very strong; 4) if the number of BS antennas is sufficiently large, the proposed
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G-NS AN precoder outperforms the conventional NS AN precoder in the presence of phase
noise.
Interesting extensions of this paper which could be studied in future research include the impact
of HWIs on the physical layer security of multi-cell massive MIMO systems, pilot sequence
design under an average power constraint, and optimal AN precoder design for secrecy rate
maximization under HWIs.
APPENDIX
A. A Useful Theorem from Free Probability Theory
Theorem 1 [34]: If (U,V) ∈ CN are free from (Y,Z) ∈ CN , then Tr (UYVZ) =
Tr (U) Tr (V)Tr (YZ) + Tr (Y)Tr (Z) Tr (UV)− Tr (U)Tr (V)Tr (Y)Tr (Z) , (38)
where Tr (·) = limN→∞ tr (·) /N .
B. Proof of Lemma 1
The ergodic secrecy rate achieved by the kth MT in symbol interval t ∈ {B + 1, . . . , T} is
given by [7, Lemma 1]
Rseck (t) = E
[
[Rk(t)− log2(1 + γE(t))]+
]≥ [E[Rk(t)]− CE(t)]+ (a)≥ [Rk(t)− CE(t)]+ = Rseck (t),
(39)
where Rseck (t) is an achievable lower bound for Rseck (t), and (a) uses (16). By averaging Rseck (t)
over all symbol intervals t ∈ {B + 1, . . . , T} we obtain Lemma 1. This completes the proof.
C. Proof of Lemma 2
The expectation given in (19) for k ∈ Sb is calculated as E
[
gHk Θ
H
k (t)fk
]
(a)
= E
[
gˆHk Ψ
H
t0
(t)gˆk
‖gˆk‖ e
j(φk(t)−φk(t0))
]
(b)
= tr
(
E
[
gˆkgˆ
H
k
‖gˆk‖
]
E
[
ΨHt0 (t)
])
E
[
ej(φk(t)−φk(t0))
]
=
√
βkNλk · e−
σ2
ψ
+σ2
φ
2
|t−t0|, (40)
where Ψt0(t) = diag
(
ej(ψ1(t)−ψ1(t0))1T1×N/No , . . . , e
j(ψNo (t)−ψNo (t0))1T1×N/No
)
and λk is defined in
Lemma 2. In (40), (a) exploits that the channel estimate and the estimation error are uncorrelated
[21], and (b) exploits the mutually independence of gˆkgˆHk , ΨHt0 (t), and ej(φk(t)−φk(t0)). This
completes the proof.
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D. Proof of Lemma 3
In (17), the term reflecting the interference caused by the signal intended for MT l ∈ Sb to
MT k ∈ Sb can be expanded as E
[∣∣gHk ΘHk (t)fl∣∣2] =
E
[∣∣∣∣gHk (t0)ΨHt0 (t) gˆl‖gˆl‖ej(φk(t)−φk(t0))
∣∣∣∣
2
]
= E
[
tr
(
gk(t0)g
H
k (t0)Ψ
H
t0
(t)
gˆlgˆ
H
l
‖gˆl‖2Ψt0(t)
)]
(a)
= βk +


E
[
tr
(
XHl gk(t0)g
H
k (t0)Xlψbψ
H
b
) ]
β2l ω
H
l Θ
b
σ(t0)
Σ−1b Θ
H
σ(t0)
ωlN
− βk

Eψ
[(
1
N
tr
(
ΨHt0 (t)
))2 ]
, (41)
where Xl = βlωHl Θbσ(t0)Σ
−1
b ⊗IN , and (a) exploits Theorem 1 from free probability theory, since
the phase drift matrices Ψt0(t) and ΨHt0 (t) are free from gk(t0)gHk (t0) and
gˆlgˆ
H
l
‖gˆl‖2
. For notational
simplicity, we define I = E
[
tr
(
XHl gk(t0)g
H
k (t0)Xlψbψ
H
b
)]
, which can be further expanded as
I = E
[
tr
(
YHlkgkg
H
k Ylkgkg
H
k
)]
+ tr
(
βkX
H
l Xl(Σb − βk
(
Wbk +U
b
k
))⊗ IN) +
E
[
tr
(
XHl gkg
H
k Xl
(
Ubk ⊗ diag
(
g
(1)
k , . . . , g
(N)
k
)))]
, (42)
where
Ylk = Θ
H
k (t0)Xl
[
ΘHk (Bb−1 + 1)ωk(Bb−1 + 1), . . . ,Θ
H
k (t0)ωk(t0)
]T
. (43)
Denoting the tth column of IN by eNt ∈ CN×1, the first term on the right hand side of (42),
denoted by I1, can be expanded as
I1 =
∑
n1,n2,b1,b2
[βkXle
Bb
b1
⊗ IN ]n1n1[βkXleBbb2 ⊗ IN ]Hn2n2 × ωk(b1)ω∗k(b2)Θ(n1, n2, b1, b2, t0)
=
∣∣tr (βkXl(Θbσ(t0)ωk ⊗ IN))∣∣2 + tr (β2kXHl Xl(Wbk ⊗ IN))
+
N∑
|n1−n2|≤
N
N0
β2k(e
N
n1)
HXl
(
(Wbk −Θbσ(t0)ωkωHk Θbσ(t0))⊗ eNn1(eNn2)H
)
XHl e
N
n2, (44)
where the expectation with respect to the phase drift, Θ(n1, n2, b1, b2, t0), depends on the number
of LOs, No, and is given by Θ(n1, n2, b1, b2, t0) =
E
[
eθ
n1
k
(b1)−θ
n1
k
(t0)−θ
n2
k
(b2)+θ
n2
k
(t0)
]
=


e−
σ2
ψ
+σ2
φ
2
|b1−b2| |n1 − n2| ≤ NNo ,
e−
σ2
ψ
+σ2
φ
2
|t0−b1|e−
σ2
ψ
+σ2
φ
2
|t0−b2| |n1 − n2| > NNo .
(45)
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Furthermore, we rewrite Ubk = (κMTt + κBSr )pτ
∑Bb
t=1 e
Bb
t (e
Bb
t )
H and diag
(
g
(1)
k , . . . , g
(N)
k
)
=∑N
n=1 |(eNn )Hgk|2eNn (eNn )H . Using these results in the third term on the right hand side of (42),
denoted by I2, we obtain
I2 = β
2
ktr
(
XHl Xl(U
b
k ⊗ IN)
)
+
N∑
n=1
β2k(e
N
n )
HXl
(
Ubk ⊗ eNn (eNn )H
)
Xle
N
n . (46)
Applying (44) and (46) in (41) and exploiting E
[ (
1
N
tr
(
ΨHt0 (t)
))2 ]
= 1−ǫ
No
+ ǫ, we obtain the
result in Lemma 3 for k, l ∈ Sb.
For the case of l /∈ Sb, the multiuser interference term simplifies to
E
[∣∣gHk ΘHk (t)fl∣∣2] = E
[∣∣∣∣gHk (t0)ΨHt0 (t) gˆl‖gˆl‖ej(φk(t)−φk(t0))
∣∣∣∣
2
]
= βk, (47)
where the last equality follows from the independence of gk, gˆl, l /∈ Sb, and ΨHt0 (t). This
completes the proof.
E. Proof of Lemma 4
The AN leakage power received at the kth MT in time slot t can be expanded as
LkAN(t) = E
[
tr
(
gˆkgˆ
H
k Ψ
H
t0 (t)AA
HΨt0(t)
)]
+ E
[
eHk (t0)Ψ
H
t0 (t)AA
HΨHt0 (t)ek(t0)
]
. (48)
By using Theorem 1, the first term in (48) can be further expanded as
βkL+
(
E
[
tr
(
gˆkgˆ
H
k AA
H
)]− βkL)Eψ
[(
1
N
tr (Ψt0(t))
)2]
= βkL
(
1− 1
No
)
(1− ǫ) , (49)
since phase drift matrices Ψt0(t) and ΨHt0 (t) are free from gˆkgˆHk and AA
H
. Furthermore, we
exploited gˆHk A = 0, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, which holds for the NS AN precoder.
The second term in (48) is equal to βkL(1− λk), with λk as defined in Lemma 2, due to the
mutual independence of the estimation error vector ek(t0), the phase drift matrix Ψt0(t), and
the AN precoder A. Combining these two terms completes the proof.
F. Proof of Lemma 5
For the G-NS AN precoder, we rewrite the leakage power received at the kth MT in time slot
t as
LkAN =
Mo∑
m=1
E
[(
g
(m)
k
)H (
Θ
(m)
k (t)
)H
A(m)A
H
(m)Θ
(m)
k (t)g
(m)
k
]
, (50)
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where g(m)k ∈ CN/Mo×1 contains the ((m−1)N/Mo+1)th to the (mN/Mo)th elements of vector
gk, 1 ≤ m ≤Mo, and Θ(m)k (t) ∈ CN/Mo×N/Mo is a diagonal matrix with the ((m−1)N/Mo+1)th
to the (mN/Mo)th elements of matrix Θk(t) on its main diagonal. Using similar steps as in
Appendix E but with No/Mo substituted by No for calculation of the expectation terms in (50),
we obtain (29). This completes the proof.
G. Proof of Proposition 1
We first adopt Jensen’s inequality to upper bound the eavesdropper’s capacity at time interval
t, as CE(t) ≤ log2 (1 + E[γE(t)]), with γE(t) given in (15). One further step to simplify E[γE(t)]
requires the statistical independence between gkE(t) and the matrix X = GHEΨH(t)(qAAH +
ΥBSt )Ψ(t)GE. We note that the entries of GE are independent complex Gaussian random
variables. On the other hand, for the G-NS AN precoder, the columns of ΨH(t)A ∈ CN×L
form an orthonormal basis. Hence, GHEΨH(t)A also has independent complex Gaussian entries,
which are independent from the entries of gkE(t) [9]. Besides, the term GHEΨH(t)ΥBSt Ψ(t)GE
converges to a deterministic diagonal matrix for N → ∞, which is obviously independent of
gkE(t). Therefore, E
[
gkE(t)X
−1(gkE(t))
H
]
can be rewritten as E
[
gkE(t)E[X
−1](gkE(t))
H
]
, with
E[X−1] approximated as a scaled identity matrix as in [7, Appendix C]. This leads to the upper
bound given in (31).
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